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Abstract 
In this paper we give an overview of labour supply incentives present in the Estonian 
income support system and how changes during the last ten years in the Estonian bene-
fit system have influenced the incentives. As Estonia belongs to the group of EU coun-
tries where both taxes and social expenditures are relatively low, they generate high 
motivation to actively participate in the labour market, in general. Also the gradual in-
troduction of contribution based and earnings related benefits, such as unemployment 
insurance benefits, parental benefits, a fully funded pension scheme together with earn-
ings-related public pension scheme have all significantly increased rewards from em-
ployment and are often associated with increased labour supply as well as a reduction in 
undeclared work. The increase of the statutory retirement ages for men and women have 
increased average employment rates of the elderly, but also retirement through alterna-
tive schemes, most notably disability pensions and early retirement pensions. In a few 
cases, the Estonian benefit schemes generate disincentives to seek for a job or increase 
labour effort, affecting people both with low and high earnings. In case of unemploy-
ment benefits and early retirement benefits, even marginal income from labour leads to 
loss of all benefits, thus discouraging part time work. Also there are very high effective 
marginal tax rates when increasing work effort when receiving subsistence benefits and 
parental benefits, in certain cases. These disincentives become even more significant in 
this economic crisis when people are faced with long-term unemployment and it is vital 
that they are encouraged to return to the labour market.  
Keywords: labour supply incentives, social security, Estonia 
JEL-codes: H53, H55, J08, J21, J26 
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1  Introduction 
The level and structure of labour taxes and social benefits and their possible effects on 
labour supply incentives have been the subject of much attention in recent years in Es-
tonia, despite the fact that the redistribution of income from market activities via taxes 
and benefits is one of the lowest in Europe, similar to other Baltic countries. It is well 
understood both by the political stakeholders and social partners that (although not the 
main determinant of recent swings in employment rates in Estonia) the income support 
system together with labour taxes influence activity rates for some socio-economic 
groups and benefit recipients. Especially now, when unemployment rates are reaching 
historic highs, after having declined for almost a decade, it is very important that the so-
cial security system along with active labour market policies support the smooth return 
to the labour market. 
Estonia, like the other new member states from Central and Eastern Europe, espe-
cially the Baltic countries, are characterised by low overall tax burdens. Still they dis-
play relatively high taxes on labour, in contrast to low taxes on capital, and in all the 
Baltic countries, the tax wedge on labour is higher than the average of the EU-15 coun-
tries. On the other hand, also social expenditures, including expenditures on unemploy-
ment benefits, early retirement benefits or social assistance are low, which increase in-
centives to work. 
In this paper we give an overview of the labour supply incentives present in the Es-
tonian income support system and how the reforms in the Estonian benefit system have 
influenced incentives during the last ten years. In Estonia both taxes and social expen-
ditures are relatively low generating high motivation to actively participate in the labour 
market, in general. Also the gradual introduction of contribution based benefits, such as 
unemployment insurance benefits, parental benefits, a fully funded pension scheme to-
gether with a contribution-related public pension component have all increased rewards 
from employment. Still, in a few cases the social benefits and their interplay with labour 
taxes may create disincentives to seek for a job or increase labour effort. For example, 
even marginal income from employment is prohibited in case a person receives unem-
ployment benefits or early retirement benefits; there are also very high effective mar-4  IFAU – Labour supply incentives and income support systems in Estonia 
ginal tax rates when increasing work effort in case of subsistence benefits and parental 
benefits. 
In this paper we first describe the general features of the Estonian tax and benefit 
system. Then we focus on three major reforms in the Estonian income support system: 
1) pension reforms with the increase in the retirement age, introduction of early retire-
ment pension, and a closer connection between previous earnings and future pensions, 
2) the introduction of an unemployment insurance system, 3) the introduction of paren-
tal benefit. We also briefly analyse social assistance benefits. 
There are not many empirical studies on the impact of the tax-benefit system on la-
bour supply and retirement behaviour or transitions from inactivity or unemployment to 
employment in Estonia. Those available are mostly locally published research reports or 
academic theses by Estonian institutions. In the current paper, I rely much on my joint 
work with Reelika Leetmaa, Lauri Leppik, Alari Paulus, Marre Karu, and others. 
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 describes the Estonian tax-
benefit system, labour market structure, and main factors influencing the labour market. 
Section 3 gives an overview of recent major reforms, their background and the impact 
of these reforms. Section 4 concludes by summarizing previous analyses and discussing 
the most recent changes in the tax and benefit policy as a reaction of the current eco-
nomic crisis. 
2  Background 
2.1  Size of the public sector and social policy 
After regaining its independence in 1991, Estonian governments, similar to other Baltic 
states, focused on macroeconomic stabilisation, reintegration in the European economy 
and fighting increasing poverty. The main components of the policy where 1) liberali-
zation of prices and gradual elimination of all state subsidies; 2) privatization of state-
owned enterprises; 3) introduction of a separate currency by means of a currency board 
system; 4) maintaining a very conservative fiscal policy; 5) implementing a liberal for-
eign trade regime. (Paas and Eamets 2007)  
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Rapid changes in the structure of the economy and the labour market, with insuffi-
cient tax revenues to support the social security system, resulted in high unemployment 
and poverty. Like other Soviet economies, Estonia started with almost full-employment 
(or hidden unemployment in state enterprises). Rising unemployment created the need 
for an unemployment protection system that had to be built from scratch. 
Estonian opted, from the very beginning of the transition period, for a liberal social 
policy with relatively low taxes and social security expenditures and moderate levels of 
employment protection (about OECD average). Also the impact of trade unions has 
been very weak. With a tax burden around 30–33% of GDP and social expenditures 
around 12–13% of GDP (see Table 1), Estonia is among the EU countries with the low-
est redistribution via taxes and benefits.  
Table 1 General government revenues and expenditures, % of GDP 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Total general government expenditure   36.5  35.1  35.9  34.9  34.1  34.0  34.2  35.5  40.9 
Total general government revenue  36.2  35  36.1  36.6  35.7  35.5  37.1  38.2  37.9 
Surplus / Deficit*  -0.2  -0.1  0.3  1.7  1.7  1.5  2.9  2.7  -3.0 
Tax burden  31.3  30.5  31.1  30.9  30.7  30.9  31.3  33.1  32.2 
Government consolidated gross debt   5.2  4.8  5.7  5.6  5.0  4.5  4.3  3.5  4.8 
General government total expenditure 
on social protection and health** 
15.1  14.3  14.2  14.0  14.4  14.0  13.9  14.3   
Social protection expenditure 
(ESSPROS) 
14.0  13.1  12.7  12.6  13.0  12.7  12.4     
Source: Eurostat (on-line database), accessed 17.06.2009; Piglia, A. “Population and social conditions.” Statistics in 
Focus 40/2009. Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-09-040/EN/KS-SF-09-040-
EN.PDF  
Note: * Surplus is not exactly the difference between revenues and expenditures due to rounding;   
** according to COFOG classification categories 07 and 10. 
 
During the 1990s, the social security system was initially oriented to flat transfers, 
such as flat rate benefits to families with children, and flat unemployment assistance 
benefits; also, old-age pensions were mostly flat rate. Only temporary sickness benefits 
in case of illness or pregnancy were related, and still are, to previous earnings. There 
were also means tested social assistance benefits which were meant to protect against 
severe poverty, and they have to a large extent also remained unchanged.  
Since the beginning of this decade, however, several contribution-based insurance 
schemes were introduced. First in the state pensions system (so-called first pillar), pen-
sions started to depend more on previous contributions since 2000 and an additional 6  IFAU – Labour supply incentives and income support systems in Estonia 
compulsory (with a voluntary transition period) fully funded pension scheme was intro-
duced in 2002. In 2002 also contributions to the newly founded unemployment insur-
ance system started, and in 2003 the first benefits were paid out. In 2004, a new and 
very generous parental benefit scheme was introduced where benefits depended on pre-
vious earnings.  
All these recent reforms were designed to provide insurance during periods of inac-
tivity or unemployment, on the one hand, and also promote employment via entitlement 
effect. We discuss the impact of these reforms in more detail in Section 3. 
Although the level of social expenditure as a share in GDP is considerably lower in 
Estonia than in the EU (12.4% in Estonia vs 26.9% in the EU27 in 2006) the main 
structure of the public expenditure is similar to other countries (see Figure 1), with pen-
sion expenditure taking the largest share (45.2%), followed by expenditure on health 
and sickness (31.2%). Estonia spends relatively more on families and children and very 
































Figure 1 Structure of social expenditure in Estonia and the European Union in 2006, % 
of total social expenditure and GDP 
Source. Piglia, A. “Population and social conditions.” Statistics in Focus 40/2009. Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.-
europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-09-040/EN/KS-SF-09-040-EN.PDF 
 
In Estonia, workers’ temporary or permanent withdrawal from the labour force is in-
fluenced by the following social insurance components:  
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1)  old-age pension and its various forms, including early-retirement pension and 
deferred old-age pension; special pensions and pensions under favourable con-
ditions; 
2)  incapacity for work pension (disability pension); 
3)  unemployment insurance benefits (contribution based) and unemployment 
allowance (flat rate); redundancy benefits; 
4)  subsistence benefits (means tested social assistance benefits);  
5)  sickness benefits; 
6)  maternity and parental benefits. 
In 2007, the official retirement age is 63 for men and 60 for women. The retirement 
age for women is growing gradually and will catch up with that of men in 2016. The 
qualification period for old-age pension is 15 years of contributions of social tax. Early 
retirement is possible three years before the normal retirement age, but there are various 
occupational pensions that allow retiring even earlier. 
The use of different old-age pensions and incapacity pensions has led to the situation 
where a large number of people receive a pension before the official retirement age. For 
example, in the beginning of 2007, about 30% of men aged 60 (i.e. 3 years before the 
official retirement age) received various types of old-age pensions, and 20% received an 
incapacity pension, which means that half of men of this age received a pension. 
Among 57 year-old women (three years before retirement age), 20% received various 
types of old-age pensions and 20% received an incapacity pension, totalling at 40%.  
The impact on unemployment insurance benefits and unemployment assistance bene-
fits on labour supply are likely to be small, because their duration is short (maximum 
one year) and the replacement rates have typically been low. Also subsistence benefits 
have little impact, because of their low level. Further there are effectively no special 
benefits for the unemployed addressed to the elderly, except slightly longer unemploy-
ment assistance benefits right before the retirement age. 
The impact of sickness benefits is arguably also small, because their duration is rela-
tively short in Estonia, with maximum 182 days. 
 8  IFAU – Labour supply incentives and income support systems in Estonia 
Table 2 Share of people receiving various social benefits, % of age groups, 2007 
  16-24  25-54  55-64 
Unemployment insurance benefits  0.0%  0.3%  0.4% 
Unemployment assistance benefits  0.3%  0.5%  0.6% 
Subsistence benefits  2.1%  1.3%  1.3% 
Old-age pensions  0.0%  0.4%  43.9% 
Disability pensions  2.8%  7.2%  13.7% 
National pensions  1.5%  0.4%  0.5% 
Sickness benefits  2.4%  2.9%  2.5% 
Notes: Pensions - Estonian National Social Insurance Board (Sotsiaalkindlustusamet), http://www.ensib.ee/eelarve/-
pens2006lisadega.xls, pensioners as 1 January 2007. Old-age pensions include also various other schemes (early re-
tirement pensions, anticipated pensions, pensions under favourable condition, deferred pensions) 
Unemployment insurance benefits – Statistics Estonia on-line database, accessed 16.02.2009 – benefit recipients in 
January 2007. 
Unemployment allowances – Estonian Labour Market Board – benefit recipients in 31 January 2007 allocated into 
the age groups using the same proportions that of the all registered unemployed in January 2007 http://www2.-
sm.ee/tta/failid/kuuaruanne%20%28jaan%202007%29.xls. Note: age groups are 16-24, 25-49, 50 - pension age 
Subsistence benefits – Ministry of Social Affairs - http://www.piksel.ee/sveeb/index.php - total number of persons in 
the families who received subsistence benefits in the first quarter of 2007. Proportions of age groups are determined 
using the age structure in the Household Budget Survey 2007 data. 
Sickness benefits – Estonian National Health Insurance Fund, 2008 data, own calculations 
Population – Eurostat on-line database, accessed 05.05.2008 – at the beginning of 2007 
 
2.2  Labour market developments 
During the last twenty years, the main factors influencing the Estonian labour market 
are large macroeconomic shocks, both positive and negative. As is typical for a former 
Soviet economy, Estonia started with very high employment rates, 82% for men and 
71% for women in the age group 15-69 before the economic transition in 1989, and 
virtually no unemployment (see Figure 2). The beginning of the transition, together 
with the privatisation and restructuring of the economy, involving a declining share of 
agriculture, yielded a decline in employment in the beginning of 1990s. It stabilised to-
wards the end of 1990s, but then the Russian financial crises in 1999 hit Estonia and 
employment declined even further. In 2000, the employment rate for men was 62% and 
54% for women. Although the economy started to grow again already in 2000, it took a 
while before employment rates increased again. Simultaneously unemployment rates 
increased rapidly, peeking in 2000 at 14.6% for men and 12.7% for women.  
Since the beginning of this decade, Estonia has experienced rapid demand-driven 
economic growth. In 2000-2007 average GDP growth rate was 8.6%, with strong em- 
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ployment growth and decline in unemployment. Unemployment fell to 4.8% in 2007. 
Wages, pensions and some other social benefits increased. Although the price level also 
rose, the real purchasing power of households increased considerably. 
The first principle for social policy and social inclusion by the Estonian governments 
has always been that employment is the best protection against poverty and exclusion. 
Partly it is self-evident, because Estonian economic policy is to keep tax levels low and 
hence there is not much to redistribute in the form of benefits. As a consequence, the 
poverty rate was high when unemployment was high, and vice versa (see Table 3). 
The boom period of the Estonian economy ended dramatically in 2008, when the real 
estate bubble burst, bank credit from Scandinavian banks was suspended and domestic 
consumption dropped, and also main export markets suffered from the global downturn. 
To some extent the situation will be similar to the beginning of 2000, when unemploy-
ment rates were high and a large share of people lived in absolute poverty. During re-
cent years the social security system has become more generous, mainly because of the 
introduction of the unemployment insurance (UI) system. The UI system is still likely to 
have only small effects, as only half of the unemployed are eligible for insurance bene-
fits and their duration is short (9 months in 2009). Meanwhile many households have 
heavy financial burdens, both mortgage backed housing loans and short-term consumer 
credits. This financial strain was not present in the crisis in the beginning of 2000. This 
strain puts considerable constraints on households’ budgets and may even lead to loss of 
homes. As a reaction, the government has already transferred to local municipalities ad-
ditional funds to pay out subsistence benefits, also policy options are discussed on the 
possible intervention into the housing market, but no real decision has been made. 
 















































































Figure 2 Labour force participation rates, employment rates and unemployment rates 
for men and women in Estonia in 1989-2009, age group 15-69. 
Source. Statistics Estonia, on-line database 
Note: 2009 data are for the third quarter 
Table 3 Share of population below absolute poverty line 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Total population  32.8  30.7  28.9  28.3  25.0  19.6  17.0       
              16.1  13.2  8.3  6.5 
Children aged 0-15  40.4  44.1  39.1  36.6  33.7  26.7  25.3       
              20.3  16.8  10.7  9.4 
Note: Change in methodology in 2004 in absolute poverty. 
Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs “Sotsiaalvaldkonna arengud 2000-2006”, Sotsiaalministeeriumi toimetised nr 
2/2008, table 17; E-M. Tiit (2005) “Elatusmiinimumi ja vaesuspiiride hindamise metoodika ning sotsiaalsete indi-
kaatorite leidmisel kasutatavate tarbimiskaalude kaasajastamine”, report to Ministry of Social Affairs, September 
2005,  http://213.184.49.171/est/HtmlPages/ELMtarbimiskaaludETveebi/$file/ELM%20tarbimiskaaludETveebi.doc, 
table 19, referred to Statistics Estonia. 
 
During the period 2000–07 activity and employment rates increased both for young 
and old age cohorts and for males and females. The employment rate for 15–64 year-
olds increased from 60.7% in 2000 to 69.5% in 2008, which exceeded the EU 15 aver- 
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age of 67.3% and was reaching the EU employment target for 2010 of 70% (see Figure 










2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
Employment rate 15-64
Women employment rate 15-64
Employment rate for older workers 55-64
EU target (70%)
EU target (60%)
EU target (50%) 
 
Figure 3 Progress towards EU employment targets in Estonia 
Source. Statistics Estonia, on-line database 
Note: 2009 data are for the third quarter 
 
Older workers experienced the strongest employment growth. The employment rate 
for 55-64 years old increased from 46.3% to 60% and was especially strong for women 
in that age group (by 21.1 percentage points to 60.5%). The main reasons behind the 
relatively high employment of older workers in Estonia include the increasing retire-
ment age and incentives in pension system, which support working in retirement ages. 
(This will be discussed in more detail in Section 3). Compared to the EU averages, the 
employment rates of older workers are much higher in Estonia and have exceeded the 
EU employment target for 55–64 year-olds since 2002. The current economic crisis will 
also, of course, have an impact on the older workforce. 
Also the female employment rate increased steadily in 2000-2008 and reached the 
EU objective of 60% in 2005. However, compared to some other EU countries, specifi-
cally Scandinavian countries, where the female employment rates are above 70%, there 
is a good potential for increasing the female employment in Estonia. A potential source 
for that could be increasing part-time employment among females as in 2007 only 12  IFAU – Labour supply incentives and income support systems in Estonia 
12.1% of females worked part-time in Estonia as compared to the 32.6% in the EU25 
and 36.7% in the EU15. This might be the result of low wages, which make it unprofit-
able to take up part-time employment. The gender wage gap in Estonia is one of the 
highest in EU (25% in 2005, 30% in 2007)
c
The motivation behind some of the recent reforms has been the ageing population. 
This problem has been approached by recent governments from different angles. First, 
the reforms in the pension system since mid 1990s (such as, the increase in the pension 
age and the introduction of the funded component) were supposed to tackle this issue. 
Second, within the family policy area, the focus of the benefits has dramatically shifted 
towards rewarding births, and fully compensating the withdrawal from the labour mar-
ket for (by now) 1.5 years.  
. Another reason could be high child care 
costs, which lead to the inactivity trap. Still, the main reason why females work part-
time in Estonia is the inability to find full-time job. But, of course, the development of 
childcare facilities and flexible work forms, which allow combining work and family 
obligations, could contribute to increasing female employment. 
Although the birth rates have started to increase in recent years, current demographic 
predictions show that Estonian population will decline and will be older in 2060. Ac-
cording to the population projections by Eurostat
d
Changes will occur also to the age structure of the population. While, in 2008, the 
share of persons in working age (15-64) is 68.0%, by 2030 it is projected to be 63.2% 
and by 2060 55.3%. The share of people aged 65+ will increase from 17.2% in 2008 to 
21.7% by 2030, and further to 30.7% by 2060. Of course, these kind of long-term pre-
dictions rely on assumptions on mortality patterns and fertility behaviour, which both 
have shown considerably movements during last 20 years in Estonia. Still they indicate 
that in order to alleviate the impact of demographic changes on the labour market and 
, the population will decrease (without 
possible migration flows) from 1.34 in 2008 to 1.27 million by 2030, and further to 1.13 
million by 2060. 
                                                 
c  Eurostat online statistics database. The gender pay gap is unadjusted  for differences in male and female 
characteristics. 
d Eurostat online statistics database, Population projections 2008-2060.  
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economy, high employment rates are of crucial importance. (See also DG ECFIN and 
EPC Ageing Working Group (2009) 
3  Recent reforms of the Estonian tax-benefit system and 
their impact on labour supply incentives 
In this section we discuss three major reforms in the Estonian income support system: 
1) pension reforms with the increase in the retirement age, the introduction of early re-
tirement pension, and the closer relationship between previous earnings and future pen-
sions, 2) the introduction of the unemployment insurance system and its changes during 
2009, 3) the introduction of the parental benefit. We briefly also analyse social assis-
tance benefits. 
3.1  Pension reforms 
3.1.1  Overview of the main reforms
e
The Estonian pension system has developed in the course of the last 20 years. Radical 
changes of the pension system were undertaken immediately after the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union. According to Leppik (2004), there was a turbulent period in 1990–92, 
when the financing and benefit sides of the Estonian pension system were separated 
from the Soviet pension system. This period was followed by a period of relative stabil-
ity with a transitional pension arrangement. The second wave of transformation took 
place in 1998-2002, when the new three-pillar pension system was introduced. The re-
forms have been influenced by objective factors, such as the recession after the regain 
of independence, a declining employment rate, the ageing population, and subjective 
factors, such as, radical economic reforms with far-reaching privatization, conservative 
fiscal policy with the currency board system, relatively weak formulation of social pro-
tection rights in the Constitution, and foreign influences (EU, World Bank, IMF, Coun-
cil of Europe) (Leppik 2004). 
 
                                                 
e This section currently relies much on the overviews by Leppik (2004), Leppik and Võrk (2006), Leetmaa, Leppik, 
and Liimal (2004), and Leetmaa, Võrk, and Kallaste (2004) 14  IFAU – Labour supply incentives and income support systems in Estonia 
Since 2002, the Estonian old-age pension system consists of three pillars: 1) manda-
tory state pension insurance, 2) mandatory funded pension, 3) voluntary funded pen-
sion. 
The first pillar is a state-managed compulsory pension scheme, operating on a pay-
as-you-go principle, financed by an employer-paid social tax, and offering earnings-re-
lated pension benefits. The source of revenue is the pension insurance share of the so-
cial tax (20% for people who have not joined the second pillar, 16% for the ones who 
have joined). The objective of the first pillar is to guarantee a basic level of income to 
all pensioners.  
The amount of the first pillar pension consists on three components: base amount 
(equal amount to everybody); insurance component (depends on the social tax paid for 
the person and calculated since 1999); and the component calculated on the basis of 
years of pensionable service (depends mainly on the length of employment, calculated 
until 1998). 
Pension = base amount 
+ insurance component (since 1999) + pensionable service component (until 1998) 
 
The amount of the pensionable service component equals the number of years of pen-
sionable service of an insured person multiplied by the so-called value of a year of pen-
sionable service. The insurance component links the acquisition of new pension rights 
to social taxes paid on behalf of the person. It introduces an insurance element in the 
pension formula and counts pension insurance periods on the basis of registered social 
tax payments. This is a German-type point system, where pension rights in the state 
pension insurance are valued on the basis of social tax payments weighted against the 
average social tax. (Leppik (2004)) 
Payable pensions are increased, and the value of the insurance component and pen-
sionable service component changed by way of indexation. The index depends on the 
consumer price index (CPI) and the increase of social tax revenues, but additional ad 
hoc changes in pensions have been common. 
The statutory pension age has been increased. The pension age has increased since 
1992, when it was 55 for women and 60 for men. The main rules for the state pension  
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insurance were legislated in 1998, including gradual equalisation of pension ages for 
men and women at the level of 63. Men reached the target age in 2001, while the pen-
sion age of women will reach 63 by 2016.  
Since 1996 all working pensioners are entitled to receive a full pension while work-
ing. Thus, it means that the grant of pension and withdrawal from the labour force are 
not conditionally linked in Estonia, in general. Moreover, if a person already receives an 
old-age pension and still pays social tax at the same time, then since 1999 this will in-
crease their insurance component, which in turn increases the amount of old-age pen-
sion to be received in the following years. However, while working, one is not entitled 
to receive early-retirement pension, the national pension (minimum guaranteed pension) 
or the survivor’s pension. Also in case of some occupational pensions, one is not al-
lowed to continue working in the same occupation. 
Since 1998 it is possible to use early retirement up to 3 years before pension age with 
a reduction of pension by 0.4% per month of early retirement. This was introduced to 
alleviate the consequences of the increase in the statutory pension age and increasing 
unemployment. 
In 2002, the opportunity to postpone retirement was introduced. In case of deferred 
old-age pension the pension calculated on the basis of the pension formula is increased 
by 0.9% per each month worked after the official retirement age. 
Until 2002, state pensions constituted non-taxable income. Since then, pensions are 
taxable, but a higher non-taxable allowance applies on top of the general non-taxable 
income. Initially,  the overwhelming majority of state pensions remained  below  this 
threshold, hence they were not taxed. By 2009 a large fraction of pensions is already 
taxed, though the average tax rate is small. So the impact of taxation is not large.  
Another aspect of the pension system adjustment has been introduction of pre-funded 
supplementary pension schemes. The new Estonia pension system represents a public-
private mix, where the basic protection is provided by the state, while supplementary 
pensions (2
nd and 3
rd pillar) are administered by the private sector. 
The second pillar is a mandatory funded pension determined by contributions. Con-
tributions from employers (4% of social tax) and employees (an additional 2%) go di-
rectly to personal pension accounts. In principle, the second pillar is an individual sav-16  IFAU – Labour supply incentives and income support systems in Estonia 
ings scheme where the amount of pension depends on the total amount of contributions 
made and the rate of return of the pension fund. The second pillar administration is 
shared by the state and private structures.  
The second pillar can be joined since 2002. Payments out of the pillar will be made 
starting from 2009. The second pillar is mandatory to everybody born in 1983 and later. 
People who were born before 1983 can join the pillar on a voluntary basis until 2010 
depending on the year of birth. 
Estonia has been the only country in Central and Eastern Europe to increase the total 
contribution rate when introducing the second pillar, using both so-called top-up and 
curve-out methods. Other CEECs had used only the curve-out method, implementing 
the reform by dividing the former first pillar contribution rate between the first and the 
new second pillar. Whereas in some CEECs (e.g. Poland and Hungary) the second pillar 
was introduced with an implicit agenda to downsize the compulsory pension system and 
reduce pension expenditures, the second pillar extended the compulsory system in the 
Estonian case (Leppik and Võrk 2006).  
The third pillar is a private voluntary supplementary pension determined by contri-
butions and based on the principle of funding. Its revenue comes from contributions and 
its main aim is to offer additional saving. It is attractive as it offers tax incentives: con-
tributions are allowed to be deducted from taxable income up to the limit of 15% of an-
nual income. Benefits paid out as life-long annuities are also non-taxable, while re-
demption of units of pension funds is taxable at a lower rate of 10%, instead of the nor-
mal income tax rate. 
The impact of the second and third pillars on labour supply incentives is similar to 
private saving. The savings accumulated through the pillars reduce the need to work in 
retirement age but create, at the same time, additional motivation to work and save be-
fore retiring. Payments from the second pillar pension will only be made to persons who 
have reached the official retirement age. This means that such a system itself does not 
promote early-retirement or earlier withdrawal from the labour force. 
As the second and the third pension pillars have only just started to function, the ac-
tual income of today’s pensioners, and of those retiring in the near future depend greatly 
on the state pension from the first pillar. Because of their short-term existence it is not  
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possible to empirically estimate the impact of the second and third pillar on the em-
ployment of older people. Therefore, the following section focuses on the impact of the 
mandatory state pension insurance on labour force participation. 
State pension insurance scheme (the first  pillar)  contains  also  minimum pension 
guarantees – a fixed minimum income level (at the rate of the national pension) is guar-
anteed to those older people whose pensionable service period is very short or whose 
earnings have been very low throughout their careers. The minimum guarantee system 
is a two-tier system: first, a national pension based on age – a 63 year-old who has lived 
in Estonia for at least 5 years prior to applying for pension receives the full national 
pension; second, a person who has reached the retirement age and has contributed for 15 
years in Estonia receives the full national pension.  
Withdrawal from the labour force is also influenced by the fact that many people 
have the special rights to retire before the general retirement age in Estonia. According 
to the National Pension Insurance Act, a parent of at least three children or a parent of a 
disabled child receive an old-age pension up to five years before the official retirement 
age. In addition, there are special old-age pension schemes in Estonia for people who 
have worked in difficult conditions or in conditions harmful to health, and for repre-
sentatives of certain professions, where it is assumed that their professional work ability 
reduces with age or disappears altogether, and prevents them from continuing in the 
same field or position. There is, however, one prerequisite for receiving the pension – 
such persons should not continue working in harmful or difficult conditions. They have 
to leave the labour market or find a new job. (Leetmaa, Leppik, Liimal 2004) 
According to the Superannuated Pension Act the representatives of certain profes-
sions are also entitled to retire up to 10 years earlier depending on the length of service 
in the given field. In order to receive the pension, the person has to stop working in the 
field that entitled him or her to the right to receive superannuated pension. Such special 
laws are also in force for various civil servants, providing them with early retirement 
options. Police officers, for example, have a right to early retirement at the age of 50. In 
this case special pensions are also paid to persons who work, given that they do not 
continue on the same occupation or job. (Leetmaa, Leppik, Liimal 2004) 18  IFAU – Labour supply incentives and income support systems in Estonia 
The described pensions are in essence early retirement pensions, which allow people 
to withdraw from the labour market before the general retirement age. Unlike formal 
early-retirement pension, the described pensions include also other benefits, such as 
more generous calculation of pension qualification period or linking the amount of pen-
sion to an earlier wage. All these benefits may motivate persons to change profession or 
a job, or withdraw from the labour market. Even though the rules for pension under fa-
vourable conditions do not force anybody to leave the labour market, there is still an 
evident risk of inactivity in them: The pension is granted only if the person has stopped 
working in the industry, profession or position that entitled him or her to this pension. 
(Leetmaa, Leppik, Liimal 2004) 
Also there have been several changes in the disability pension system (töövõimetus-
pension incapacity for work pension). The main change was in 2000; since then inca-
pacity pensions may be granted only to people of working age. For a more detailed de-
scription on the legislative changes, see Leppik (2002).  
3.1.2  Impact of the reforms on employment and labour supply
f
Although there are no formal sophisticated econometric studies, statistical analyses of 
labour force survey data and pension registry microdata in various descriptive studies 
(Uudeküll, Võrk (2004), Tiit, Leppik, Võrk, Leetmaa (2004), Leetmaa, Võrk, Kallaste 
(2004)) suggest two main general effects: 
 
1) an increase of the average employment rate of elderly, 
2) a use of alternative pathways to retire – especially early retirement benefits and 
disability benefits. 
This seemingly contradicting result is possible as there are two types of pensioners. 
One larger part are those pensioners who are capable of working and their employment 
rates have increased due to the pressure from the increased pension age and improve-
ment of incentives generated by the possibility to receive pensions and labour earnings 
simultaneously. After the reforms, the average employment rate of the elderly is the 
highest among the Eastern European countries. On the other hand, for those who were 
already unemployed or inactive and whose health capital was low or skills outdated, the  
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preferred option was to use other pathways to retire after increase of the statutory pen-
sion age.  
The employment rates of the elderly have risen considerably since the increase of the 
statutory pension age (see Figure 4). For men, the employment rate in the age group 60-
64 rose from 36% in 1995 to 51% in 2002. The nominal retirement age increased from 
61 to 63 years during this period. Then the increase in the retirement age stopped and 
consequently employment rates did not change so much. 
For women the increase is even more remarkable. For the age group 55-59 the em-
ployment rate rose from 42% in 1995 to 62% in 2002 and 75% in 2008, parallel to the 
increase in their retirement age.  
A comparison of these changes in the employment rates with changes in the em-
ployment rates in the younger age group that is not directly affected by the pension age 
(age group 55-59 for men and 50-54 for women) suggests that the increase in retirement 
age has raised employment rates about 20% for men and about 25% for women in the 





















































































Figure  4  Employment rates by age and gender 1995, 2002 and 2008 (statutory 
pension ages in the parentheses) 
Source: Statistics Estonia, Labour Force Survey data 
 
For those elderly who have not found a suitable job, the increase in the statutory pen-
sion age means that there are incentives to use other pathways to retirement. And this is 
                                                                                                                                               
f This section currently relies much on the overview by Leetmaa, Võrk, Kallaste (2004) 20  IFAU – Labour supply incentives and income support systems in Estonia 
reflected in increasing rates of disability pensioners and early retirement pensioners. 
Figure 5 shows that the share of disability pensioners has increased in the age group 60-
62 for males from 18% in 2000 to 22% in 2009, and in age group 55-59 from 17% to 
21%. For females the increase is even more rapid. In the age group 55-59, the share of 























Figure 5 Share of disability pensioners in different age groups 2000-2009 
Source: Statistics Estonia, referred to Estonian National Social Insurance Board data; own calculations 
 
The share of old-age pensioners who use formal early retirement pension has de-
clined slightly. In the year of introduction (2000), 24% of all new pensioners received 
early retirement pension. In recent years it has been around 17-19%. Uudeküll and Võrk 
(2004) show that after introduction of early retirement pensions in 2000, the majority of 
people (about 60% in 2004) who started to use them had been unemployed for about 
two years before retiring and most of them start to receive the pensions immediately 
when the option arises for them. It means that early retirement pensions have not had a 
great negative influence on the employment rates of elderly. These benefits have acted 
more as a substitute to low unemployment and subsistence benefits of those already un-
employed or inactive rather than a motivation to directly withdraw from employment. 
Võrk and Habicht (2001) come to the same conclusion regarding the utilisation of inva-
lidity pensions at the second half of 1990s. 
The share of old-age pensioners who use other early retirement options such as pen-
sions under favourable conditions or special occupational pensions have been around  
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20-25% of all old-age pensions. They usually retire 3-5 years before the normal retire-
ment age (Tiit et al., 2004). 
In conclusion, the analysis of the Estonian old-age pension system and recent re-
forms shows that there are several opportunities to withdraw from the labour market and 
they are widely used. At the same time, the system has created opportunities and also 
financial incentives for continuing working, which has resulted in a relatively high em-
ployment rate for older workers in comparison with other European countries. Thus, on 
the one hand, many people in Estonia retire at the first chance and by doing so, often 
eliminate their future possibility to receive a pension and work simultaneously (in case 
of early-retirement pension), but on the other hand, the increasing employment rate of 
the recent years indicates that labour market opportunities for retired people have im-
proved (on average) during this period.  
3.2  Unemployment protection reforms 
3.2.1  Overview of the main reforms 
Like other former Soviet economies, Estonia started with almost full-employment (or 
hidden unemployment in state enterprises). Rising unemployment created the need for 
an unemployment protection system that had to built from scratch. Income protection of 
the unemployed contains several components: 
a) flat rate unemployment assistance benefits, 
b) unemployment insurance benefits, related to previous earnings – since 2003, 
c) severance payments paid by employers, 
d) means tested subsistence benefits.  
Until 2002 only low flat rate unemployment assistance benefits (with a net replace-
ment rate of less than 10% of the national average wage or about 30% of the minimum 
wage in 2002) and low means-tested subsistence benefits (with a net replacement rate of 
about 20% of the national average wage or about 60% of the minimum wage in 2002) 
were available for the unemployed. Low benefits were the result of the overall fiscal 
constraints, but were also supposed to facilitate labour supply. Partly the low benefits 
were compensated by high redundancy benefits levied on employers, but these were 22  IFAU – Labour supply incentives and income support systems in Estonia 
available only in the case of involuntary determination of employment relationship and 
not for those leaving their job voluntarily. 
Unemployment insurance benefits were paid out for the first time in 2003. The bene-
fits depend on previous earnings. The gross replacement rate is 50% of the previous 
wage during the first 100 days of the unemployment spell and 40% in the following pe-
riod. The net replacement rate of average unemployment insurance benefit to the aver-
age wage has been around 30% in 2003–07, which is about three times higher than it 
was before the introduction of the system 
In Estonia, unemployment insurance benefits are paid for 180–360 days depending 
on the length of the contribution period, and unemployment assistance benefits for up to 
270 days. If a person has already received unemployment insurance benefits before, 
then he would be entitled to the unemployment assistance benefits until the total of 270 
days are reached.  
Older people’s withdrawal from the labour force is to some extent encouraged with 
the right to continue to receive unemployment assistance benefits in case one has not 
found a job by 180 calendar days before the retirement age. Thus, it is possible to re-
ceive unemployment assistance benefits for a total of 450 days. Older workers’ motiva-
tion to seek employment can be further decreased by the fact that the unemployed per-
son who has got less than five years before the retirement age can refuse employment 
training without losing the right to receive the benefit. For an ordinary unemployed per-
son the benefit payment could be terminated in case the person has refused twice to 
participate in the employment training. It can be assumed, however, that these measures 
have little impact on older workers’ labour supply, because unemployment assistance 
benefits are low. 
Employees are also entitled to severance payments if the reason for dismissal was the 
liquidation of enterprise, bankruptcy of the employer, lay-off or age. In the private sec-
tor, the amount of the severance payments depends on the previous work record and 
ranges from 2-4 months’ salary. If the contract was terminated because the employee 
was not suitable due to professional skills or health, the severance payment is 1 month’s 
salary. In the public sector, the amounts of the severance payments can be much higher 
than in the private sector. The amount of the severance payment in the public sector de- 
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pends also on the length of previous employment and ranges from 2 month’s salary up 
to 12 month’s salary. 
3.2.2  Impact of the reforms on employment and labour supply 
There are many possible effects of the introduction of unemployment insurance system. 
First, unemployment insurance benefits should increase unemployment duration. Al-
though exact quantitative estimates on the effects of the increase in unemployment in-
surance benefits on unemployment duration are missing in Estonia, a few studies sug-
gest a possible relationship between the size of various benefits and job search intensity. 
A study by Võrk and Leetmaa (2007), which evaluated the effectiveness of the ser-
vice to those made collectively redundant, also included an analysis of the effectiveness 
of collective redundancy benefits (severance payments) on the probability to receive 
unemployment insurance benefits and working following the 1-6 months of the lay-off. 
They found that larger redundancy benefits significantly increased the probability to re-
ceive unemployment insurance benefits. For example, they estimate that workers who 
received redundancy benefits of more than 27 thousand EEK per worker had almost 20-
30 percentage points higher probability to receive also unemployment insurance bene-
fits, meaning that they were registered unemployed 1-3 months after lay-off compared 
to workers who received redundancy benefits that were less than 10 thousand EEK. An 
earlier study Leetmaa and Võrk (2004) also found that those persons eligible for redun-
dancy benefits had lower hazard rates to leave unemployment compared to those who 
were not eligible for redundancy benefits. However, it is not clear whether the impact of 
redundancy benefits can be directly extended to unemployment insurance benefits. 
But the small portion of unemployed who get both layoff compensation and unem-
ployment insurance benefits are well protected and the income they receive at the be-
ginning of the unemployment period as benefits exceeds their previous wages by 1.5 
times. Those laid off in the public sector can feel especially secure, since their layoff 
compensation sometimes equals a year’s salary. However, the level of insurance for the 
majority of unemployed is low. For instance, in 2006, only 25% of the newly unem-
ployed people registered with the Labour Market Board received unemployment insur-
ance benefits and approximately 46% received unemployment assistance benefits. Al-
most a third of the registered unemployed did not receive any benefits, but they had the 24  IFAU – Labour supply incentives and income support systems in Estonia 
opportunity to apply for subsistence benefits. The main reasons for the low coverage of 
the unemployment insurance benefits include failure to comply with the qualification 
criteria (e.g., long-term unemployment) and voluntary unemployment (persons who 
terminate the work contract voluntarily or in agreement with the employer are excluded 
from unemployment insurance benefits). In recent years the coverage has increased, be-
cause a large share of unemployment is caused by collective lay-offs. 
As for the majority of unemployed the benefits are still moderate (50% gross re-
placement rate during the first 100 days), the size of the unemployment traps is not very 
high. Marginal effective tax rate calculated by Eurostat was 63% in 2007 in Estonia, 
below the EU average. But it has steadily increased (from 48% in 2001) due to the im-
plementation of the unemployment insurance system. As mentioned above, part-time 
working and receiving unemployment benefits is not allowed simultaneously, which 
may discourage a smooth transition from unemployment to work via part-time jobs. 
In 2007 the unemployment insurance system changed slightly to make it easier to 
qualify for benefits. The reference period for fulfilling the minimum contribution period 
was extended. To be eligible one, initially, had to make contributions for at least 12 
months during the previous 24 months prior to registering as unemployed. In 2007 the 
reference period was extended and now contributions are needed for at least 12 months 
during 36 months. This may potentially reduce the labour supply via the entitlement ef-
fect, as now it is easier to qualify for the benefits, but this effect is most likely small. 
On 1 July 2009, the new Employment Contracts Act (Töölepingu seadus) took effect 
together with some changes in the unemployment insurance scheme. It was supposed to 
move the Estonian system closer to the flexicurity concept by making it easier and 
cheaper to lay off workers (increased flexibility) and raising unemployment insurance 
benefits (increased security). Because of the fiscal crisis only the first part actually was 
realised, the increase of benefits was postponed. 
In order to increase labour market flexibility, dismissal procedures were made easier 
by  reducing advance notice by 30 calendar days to between two weeks and three 
months, depending on the length of the previous employment contract. In addition, the 
redundancy benefit amount was reduced by one month’s salary to between one and 
three months’ average wages, depending on the length of previous employment. In the  
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case of people who have an employment tenure greater than 20 years, a five-year tran-
sition time will be implemented, during which they will retain the existing level of re-
dundancy benefits – that is, four months’ earnings. 
Initially it was planned that the unemployment insurance benefit would be raised 
from 50% to 70% of the previous earnings during the first 100 days of unemployment, 
and from 40% to 50% after that period. In addition, to increase the number of persons 
eligible for the unemployment insurance benefit, persons who left their job voluntarily 
would also be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. In the latter case, the rate 
of the unemployment insurance benefit would have been 40% of the previous average 
remuneration and the person must have been employed for at least four years during the 
last five-year period. Because of the fiscal difficulties of the current government the in-
crease in benefits was postponed.  
The most plausible result of the reforms is that the flow into unemployment will in-
crease as it is cheaper for firms to fire employees. Basic economic theory also suggests 
reduced firing costs should also stimulate hiring. The reduction in redundancy benefits 
reduces income of the unemployed which may increase incentives to search for a job. 
However, the positive effects on hiring and labour supply are likely to be modest in the 
current economic crisis. 
3.3  Other benefit schemes 
3.3.1  Introduction of parental benefits 
There are the following major types of family benefits in Estonia in 2009: 
•  universal child allowance and child care allowance, which depend on the number of 
children and their age, paid from the central government budget, 
•  maternity benefits, paid from the health insurance fund during pregnancy and 
shortly after child birth, 
•  parental benefits, introduced in 2004, related to previous income of the parent, paid 
from the central government budget after maternity benefits have exhausted, 
•  other minor benefits (e.g. refund of study loans for parents with children, additional 
vacation days, special benefits for disabled children, conscript’s child benefit, etc). 
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In 1998-2003,  universal family benefits were the major instrument in supporting 
families. This was justified as nearly one third of children lived below the absolute pov-
erty line. So the benefits were relatively well targeted to the poor, equal and easy to ad-
minister. As employment rates increased, and poverty rates decreased, the focus of the 
family support shifted from poverty alleviation to influence the very low rate of fertility. 
It was stipulated that the birth of a child should not in itself carry a risk of poverty and 
decline in the quality of life, including those households who had high labour earnings. 
In 2004, the discussion culminated with the introduction of new very generous measure 
called parental benefit (“vanemahüvitis”), which guaranteed the previous wage of a par-
ent (100% replacement rate) up to 11 months after child birth. There was a minimum 
benefit for those who had not worked before or who had very low earnings, and a high 
upper ceiling (three times the national average wage two years back). The benefit was 
extended to 14 months in 2006 and to 18 months in 2008. (If a parent received mater-
nity benefit, the period for parental benefit was slightly shorter.) In addition, the birth 
allowance, a one-off flat rate benefit for the parents, was also increased in 2006. 
The work by Võrk, Karu, and Tiit (2009) suggest that the parental benefit has indeed 
influenced fertility behaviour, especially among high-earning women who gained most 
from the new benefit. They also show that the parental benefit scheme raised the labour 
force participation of low wage earners before child birth. This entitlement effect is 
caused by the fact that those who have  worked previously, even  part-time,  receive 
higher benefits than those who have not worked at all. On the other hand, the benefit 
has reduced the speed of returning to the labour market after childbirth, especially 
among the top quintile of wage earners (see Figure 6). In 2002, 30% of women whose 
labour earnings were among the top quintile worked sixth months after childbirth. In 
2004 this has dropped to 12%. As the parental benefits were prolonged from 11 months 
to 14 months the return to the labour market was postponed even further.  
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Figure 6 Share of women receiving labour income 0-23 months after giving birth in 
2002, 2004 and 2006. 
Source: Estonian National Social Insurance Board microdata; own calculations 
 
For high-earning women the postponed return to the labour market may be due to the 
partial restriction on receiving parental benefits and high wages simultaneously (see the 
upper kink in Figure 7). Also the scheme discourages working at a low wage (around 
the minimum wage) while on parental leave. Although it has been suggested to remove 
these kinks in the benefit formula, the lower kink was made only slightly smaller in 

















Figure 7 Parental benefits and gross earnings in August 2007 
3.3.2  Subsistence benefits scheme 
Subsistence benefits in Estonia are a state aid (social assistance benefits) to needy peo-
ple paid by local governments. Subsistence benefits are paid only in case all other 
measures aimed at alleviating poverty and need have proven ineffective in increasing an 
income. Subsistence benefits guarantee the income level, which should protect people 
from suffering severe poverty. 
Subsistence benefits are provided to a person living alone or to a family whose 
monthly net income, after the deduction of the housing expenses (up to a certain limit), 
is below the subsistence level. The subsistence level is based on minimum expenses 
made on consumption of food, clothing, footwear and other goods and services which 
satisfy the primary needs. The subsistence level is fixed for each year by the state 
budget. In 2009, the amount was 1000 EEK per month for a person living alone or for 
the first member of the family. The subsistence level of the second and each subsequent 
member of a family is 80 per cent of the subsistence level of the first member of the 
family. 
The minimum income guarantee, which takes into account the person’s work in-
come, may influence the person’s motivation to seek a low-paid job. Kuddo et al (2002) 
found that despite the relatively small amount of social benefits and the decrease of their  
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real value, in quite a few cases (depending on family structure and income of the second 
earner) it can still be more beneficial to live off the social benefits than to get a job with 
a minimum wage or a wage close to it. This is due to the fact that additional labour 
earnings reduce the subsistence benefit by the same amount. Thus, the effective mar-
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Figure 8 Decomposition of taxes and benefits for a single parent with two children who 
receives unemployment assistance benefit and enters into employment, in 2004 
 
Thus the subsistence benefit system hides in itself an inactivity or low-wage trap 
(people may lack the motivation to increase their work effort). Estonian municipalities 
who pay out the benefits have the right to refuse the payment of benefits to people in 
working age and capable for work, but who do not study or work, and who have repeat-
edly, without good reason, refused to accept suitable work. This constitutes a mecha-
nism that makes people in working-age return to the labour market. 30  IFAU – Labour supply incentives and income support systems in Estonia 
Võrk and Paulus (2006) analysed the labour supply incentives, especially for low-
wage earners, in the Estonian tax-benefit system. The analysis used a static tax-benefit 
microsimulation model that included parameters of the Estonian tax-benefit system in 
2000–05, and it relied on Estonian Household Budget Survey data 2000–04. The labour 
supply incentives were measured as marginal effective tax rates (proportion of labour 
earnings taxed away as a result of increased labour taxes and reduced benefits) and net 
replacement rates (ratio of income after taxes and benefits in two situations) when 
moving from inactivity or unemployment to employment, or increasing work effort 
from part-time to full-time work. Both typical households (e.g. as in Carone et al 2003) 
and distribution of actual households (e.g. as in Immervoll 2004) were used. The analy-
sis was supplemented with a comparison of Estonia to other EU (old and new) member 
countries using graphical analysis and simple correlation of Eurostat indicators of mar-
ginal tax rates, and tax wedges, respectively, and employment rates in various demo-
graphic groups in 2002. As the Estonian labour taxation system is straightforward (pro-
portional income taxes and social contributions with few allowances and exceptions), 
the main focus of the paper was on the benefit side. The paper included an in-depth 
analysis of the Estonian subsistence benefit system and its interaction with family bene-
fits and labour earnings. But also incentives in the unemployment benefit, parental 
benefit and the old-age pension system were described and briefly analysed.  
Their analysis showed that for a household with two adults and two children there is 
no incentive to work at the minimum wage when the other adult is inactive as the final 
income of the household does not increase. The same holds true for a household with a 
single parent and two children, see Figure 8. Gross wage must be at least 25% of the 
average wage in order to have a motivation to supply labour.  
The microsimulation analysis by Võrk and Paulus (2006) still suggested that there 
are only about 1% of employed people and 2% of inactive or unemployed people in 
2004 who faced really 100% or higher marginal tax rate when increasing their work ef-
fort marginally or starting to work with minimum wage respectively. It means that these 
potential disincentive effects fortunately do not affect labour supply significantly.   
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4  Conclusions 
In this paper we give an overview of labour supply incentives present in the Estonian 
income support system and how changes during the last ten years in the Estonian bene-
fit system have influenced the incentives. As both taxes and social expenditures are 
relatively low, they generate high motivation to actively participate in the labour mar-
ket, in general. Also the gradual introduction of contribution based and earnings related 
benefits, such as unemployment insurance benefits, parental benefits, a fully funded 
pension scheme together with earnings-related public pensions, have all significantly 
increased rewards from employment and are often associated with increased labour 
supply and reductions in undeclared work. The increase of the statutory retirement age 
for men and women has increased average employment rates of the elderly, but also re-
tirement through alternative schemes, most notably disability pensions and early retire-
ment pensions.  
In a few cases, Estonian benefit schemes generate disincentives job search, especially 
low-paid job, or provide effort, affecting people both with low and high earnings. In the 
case of unemployment benefits and early retirement benefits, even marginal income 
from labour leads to loss of all benefits, discouraging part time work. Also there are 
very high effective marginal tax rates when increasing work effort when receiving sub-
sistence benefits and parental benefits, in certain cases. Although the opportunity to 
work and receive wages is partially built into the parental benefits system, surveys point 
to fact that the speed of high-salaried women returning to the labour market has de-
clined due to parental benefits (Võrk, Karu & Tiit 2009). 
At the same time, the rapid employment growth experienced in recent years in Esto-
nia and also empirical research (see Võrk and Paulus 2006), suggest that during the pe-
riod of economic growth in 2000-2007, the social benefits system as a whole has not re-
duced people’s motivation to go to work. However, there is reason to believe that the 
connection between work incentives and social benefits, on the one hand, and part-time 
employment, on the other, will become important again when wages drop in the next 
few years and finding jobs becomes increasingly difficult again. Already in 2009 we see 
skyrocketing unemployment rates, reductions in wages and increasing numbers  of 
families receiving various social benefits. Then it is crucial that long-term unemployed 32  IFAU – Labour supply incentives and income support systems in Estonia 
or inactive people are encouraged to return to the labour market also gradually via part-
time jobs.  
How the Estonian tax-benefit system develops in the near future is full of uncer-
tainty. There are continuous debates about what direction Estonian social policy should 
go. This year is influenced by the government’s goal to join the Euro-area in 2011, in 
order to establish confidence of foreign investors and lenders towards Estonia. To fulfil 
the 3% budget deficit Maastricht criterion, the government has reacted to declining tax 
revenues with cutting down expenditures from the central government budget, from so-
cial insurance funds, and has also set strict limits for local governments to take any 
loans. 
Also several taxes and benefits have been changed. Unemployment insurance contri-
butions have been raised significantly from 0.9% in January 2009 to 4.2% since 1 Au-
gust 2009. Also, since 1 July 2009,  temporary sickness benefits have been reduced 
through lengthening of waiting time (from one day to three days) and a drop in the re-
placement rate from 80% to 70%, in case of own sickness, and from 100% to 80%, in 
case of child’s illness. Moreover, an employer co-payment was introduced for tempo-
rary sickness benefits; now employers have to pay from the fourth to the eighth day. 
The near future may see additional changes in benefits that influence labour supply. 
It has been proposed that parental benefits should have a lower ceiling, effectively re-
ducing benefits for high-earning parents. This may influence labour supply both via the 
entitlement effect and the income effect. There is also a proposition that some additional 
family benefits should be introduced for children whose both parents are registered un-
employed, reducing poverty risk of children, but also increasing unemployment traps. 
And there have been also radical propositions that the whole benefit system should be 
restructured and benefits should rely more on means-testing, totally changing labour 
supply incentives. Concerning taxation, the  introduction of progressive income tax 
scales has been proposed. So the whole range of issues affecting labour supply incen-
tives is on the table and whether anything will change now depends on developments in 
tax revenues and the social situation in the near future.  
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